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NOTES
Overtaking State Take-Over Statutes:
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell
On March 21, 1977, Great Western United, a Delaware corporation with
its principal executive offices in Texas, having complied with the Williams
Act,I announced its tender offer 2 for 2,000,000 shares 3 of stock of Sunshine
Mining Company, a Washington corporation with its corporate headquarters
and over fifty percent of its assets located in Idaho. That same day Great
Western attempted to comply with the disclosure provisions of the Idaho
take-over law4 by filing a registration statement for the offer. Pursuant to the
Idaho statute, after submission of a registration statement, the state
commissioner has a twenty-day time period within which he may call for a
hearing on the offer. The Idaho Commissioner determined, however, that
the information disclosed in the statement was inadequate and that the
twenty-day time period would not begin to run until a complete statement
was submitted.5 Great Western then brought an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the state officials of Idaho to prevent enforcement
of the take-over statute, alleging that this state law was preempted by
federal legislation and placed an undue burden on interstate commerce. 6
Held: The Idaho take-over statute is preempted by the Williams Act and
constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce, and should therefore
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
2. A "tender offer" is a term of art that describes an offer to buy a substantial or
controlling block of securities of a publicly held company usually at a price above the current
market value. See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 65 (1973). The Idaho statute incorporates tender offer in its definition of "take-over
offer":
The offer to acquire or the acquisition of any equity security of a target company,
pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, if after the acquisi-
tion thereof the offeror would be directly or indirectly a beneficial owner of more
than five percent (5%) of any class of the outstanding equity securities of the
issuer.
IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5) (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). Neither the Williams Act nor the rules
adopted by the SEC attempt to define the term "tender offer." This has caused additional
litigation and much confusion. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1 (1977).
3. The offer was for 35% of Sunshine's outstanding shares at $15.75 per share. This offer
was characterized as "unfriendly" because Sunshine's board of directors had refused to
recommend to their shareholders Great Western's "friendly offer" of $16.75 per share.
4. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1977).
5. Id. § 30-1503(5). Sunshine was denied injunctive relief in a prior suit against Great
Western's offer for failure to show irreparable harm. Sunshine Mining Co. v. Great W. United
Corp., [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,049 (D. Idaho 1977).
6. Great Western joined the states of Maryland and New York in the suit, fearing they
would also apply their take-over statutes to the offer. See MD. CORP. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§
11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1613 (McKinney Supp. 1977). When
these two states declined to assert jurisdiction of their statutes over the take-over offer, the
court found that Great Western lacked standing to sue Maryland and the case against New York
was moot.
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be enjoined from enforcement. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439
F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
I. FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS
A. The Williams Act
During the 1960's there was a growing use of the cash tender offer as a
means for achieving corporate take-overs. Congress reacted to this
phenomenon in 1968 by enacting the Williams Act, which required the
tender offeror to file a disclosure statement with the SEC immediately prior
to the announcement of a tender offer.7 Congress's motives for enacting the
Williams Act have been the source of some confusion. In Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp.8 the Supreme Court noted that Congress designed the
Williams Act "to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the take-over bid." 9 The
Supreme Court, however, modified this interpretation of congressional in-
tent in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 10 The Piper Court stated that
while Congress approached the problem with the goal of achieving even-
handed regulation, this was not the purpose of the legislation; "neutrality is
but one characteristic directed towards a different purpose: the protection
of investors."'" Pursuant to this purpose, the timing provisions of the
Williams Act require that the offer remain open for at least ten days after it
becomes effective. 2 This post-effective waiting period 3 gives the share-
holders time to consider other options 4 which might subsequently become
available.
B. State Securities Regulation
Beginning in 1968,15 many states enacted statutes regulating corporate
take-overs.16 These statutes, unlike their federal counterpart, not only re-
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976); see Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45
HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135,144; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 2-10 (1973).
8. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
9. Id. at 58-59 (the Court held that a showing of irreparable harm was a prerequisite to
permanent injunctive relief).
10. 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (the Court held that a defeated tender offeror did not have standing
to sue for damages under the Williams Act).
11. Id. at 29.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (1976). Large companies must also meet the requirements of
antitrust laws which include a 15-day post-effective waiting period before a merger can be
consummated. Rodino-Hart-Scott Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)
(1976).
13. Advance disclosure requirements were included in the original bill, but were later
excluded by Congress in response to positions expressed by the New York Stock Exchange and
the SEC. 439 F. Supp. at 436.
14. The shareholder may either accept the offer, sell his shares in the market, or wait for
a better offer from the same or another source.
15. While the Kidwell court noted that states enacted their laws after the Williams Act,
this statement is not entirely accurate, for the Virginia take-over statute became effective on
Mar. 5, 1968, prior to the effective date of the Williams Act. VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1973
& Supp. 1977).
16. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-.120 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -
108 (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-347a to -347m (Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203
(Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (Supp. 1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to
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quire greater disclosure of information, but also require that such disclosure
be made well in advance of the offer's effective date. 17 Some statutes
additionally provide for hearings to determine the fairness of the offer.' 8
State "blue sky" laws have long been upheld by the Supreme Court as valid
exercises of state power, 19 as they tend to concentrate on transactions
occurring within the regulating state's borders. 20 These state take-over laws,
in contrast, may cover solicitations made anywhere in the world as long as
the target company has substantial contacts with the regulating state. 21 The
broad effect of these state statutes on the national securities market has
resulted in intense scrutiny by numerous commentators, many of whom
have questioned their constitutionality. 22
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. Preemption
One ground for constitutional challenge of state take-over statutes is that
federal regulation preempts conflicting state regulation. 23 The preemption
doctrine is broad in scope, and may be used to invalidate state law which
acts as an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress." 24  The Supreme Court's standards for
determining preemption have gone through three phases. During the 1930's
-15 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-1 to -12(Burns Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. §§ 17-1276 to -1285 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 292.560-.630(Baldwin Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-:1512 (West Supp. 1978); MD. CORP. &
Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110C, §§ 1-13(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1977); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-293(1)-(17) (Supp. 1977); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 80B. 01-. 13 (West Supp. 1978); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-1 to -23 (Supp. 1977);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778 (1973); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1601-1613 (McKinney Supp.
1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.041 (Page Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85(Purdon Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (Supp. 1977); VA.
CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West Spec. Pam. 1977); [1977]
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 7151-67 (Ark.); [1977] 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 33,151-71(N.J.). The Securities Commission of Texas, by administrative guidelines, recently promul-
gated a similar regulatory framework. [1977] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,615. Moreover,
the Council of State Governments will likely propose a model state take-over act. Wall St. J.,
June 24, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
17. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(1) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.03, subd. 4(West Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a) (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.05(4) (West
Spec. Pam. 1977).
18. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.03, subd. 4(West Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a) (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.05(3)-(5)
(West Spec. Pam. 1977).
19. Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yard Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
20. Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Compe-
tency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 215 (1977).
21. 439 F. Supp. at 439; see Langevoort, supra note 20.
22. See, e.g., Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Take-Over Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 23 n. 129 (1976); Note, Commerce Clause Limitations
upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1133 (1974).
23. The preemption doctrine was developed to give effect to the supremacy clause which
states that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . .any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
24. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). This traditional test of preemption was
established in Hines and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), and was
reaffirmed by the Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633
(1973), and more recently in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
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the Court would invalidate state legislation only upon a showing that
Congress expressly intended to occupy the field.25 Starting in the 1940's, the
Court began to infer the congressional intent to preempt state law from the
pervasiveness of the federal legislation in the area. 26 The trend of recent
Supreme Court decisions has been somewhat of a return to the requirement
of a clear showing of congressional intent to preempt state action. 27 In
making this determination of intent, however, the Court looks not only for
words indicating exclusivity, but also to the statute and its legislative history
from which intent may be inferred. 28
In the area of securities regulation the Supreme Court has recognized that
Congress did not intend to occupy the field completely. 29 As a result securi-
ties regulation has been implemented on both the federal and state level for
over forty years. Additionally, the Security Exchange Act of 1934 une-
quivocally declares that concurrent state securities regulation will be al-
lowed so long as it does not conflict with federal law.30 Thus, any constitu-
tional challenges to state take-over statutes based on federal preemption
must show that the state law conflicts with the federal legislation.
B. Burden on Commerce
State take-over statutes additionally have been challenged as placing an
undue burden on interstate commerce. The commerce clause31 was designed
to promote commercial intercourse among the states 32 and to create an area
of free trade. 33 The interstate market for securities is clearly included within
this protected area of trade. The state's power to police such transactions is
therefore limited by the commerce clause, and the court's task is to define
the extent of that limitation. 34 The question of determining whether a state
law places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, however, has
been one shrouded with confusion. 35 At times the Supreme Court has ap-
25. See, e.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940); H.P. Welch Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933).
26. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941).
27. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973);
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 146-52 (1963). For further discussion of this trend, see Freeman, Dynamic
Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 630 (1972); Wilner & Landy,
supra note 22, at 24 n.135.
28. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
29. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 464 (1969); see note 19 supra.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
31. "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
32. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I (1924); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1940); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645,
833 (1946).
33. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976); McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
34. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (state law which
imposed greater tax liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state sales impermissibly burdened
interstate commerce); see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
35. For discussion of the evolution of the commerce clause, see D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITU-
TIONAL POWER 260-94 (1974); Note, The Petaluma Decision: Another Indication that Federal
Courts Want to Avoid Land Use Litigation, 30 Sw. L.J. 794, 796 (1976).
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plied a two-step "reasonableness" test to ascertain whether the state legisla-
ture has acted in pursuance of a legitimate end and, if so, whether the statute
was reasonably adapted to that end. 36 In other cases the Court has addition-
ally balanced the state's interest in regulation against the effect of such
regulation on interstate commerce.3 7 In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 38 the
Court embodied this approach into a three-part test. A state law challenged
as unduly burdensome on interstate commerce will be upheld if the Court
determines that it promotes a legitimate local interest, its burden on
commerce is incidental, and any burden it does impose on commerce does
not outweigh the local interest. Regardless of the approach taken, the
threshold question remains whether the state is pursuing a legitimate local
interest. The Supreme Court has traditionally invalidated laws that favor
local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state business as such favoritism
invites "a multitude of preferential trade areas" destructive of the free trade
which the commerce clause protects. 39 Thus, the legitimate local interest
standard is of particular importance in determining whether state take-over
regulation unconstitutionally interferes with interstate commerce.
III. GREAT WESTERN UNITED CORP. v. KIDWELL
In Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell the substantive issues40 before
the court were whether Idaho's take-over statute was preempted by the
Williams Act, and whether the state statute placed an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce.
As to the question of preemption, the court concluded that a state law will
be preempted if either Congress intended to occupy the field, 41 a dominant
federal interest in sole regulation exists, or the state law conflicts with the
federal scheme. The court determined that the take-over statute was not
preempted under the first two tests as Congress had not intended to occupy
the field, evidenced by traditional acceptance of concurrent federal and
state regulation in the securities area. 42 Further, there is no dominant federal
interest in sole regulation of this field, as the states also have a valid interest
in regulating securities transactions. The court, however, held the state law
was preempted because it conflicted with the federal scheme. 43
36. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190(1938).
37. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
38. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
39. Bostcn Stock Exch. v. State Trade Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977); Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951). The Supreme Court has viewed with particular
suspicion state laws which require business operations to be performed in the home state which
could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. "This particular burden on interstate
commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 145 (1970).
40. Although the defendants raised a panoply of defenses in avoidance of Great West-
ern's suit, the court found that jurisdiction, venue, and service were proper against the state of
Idaho. 439 F. Supp. at 430-34.
41. Id. at 435.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 437.
1978]
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Such conflict was found to exist on two levels. First, while the Williams
Act merely requires disclosure immediately before the offer becomes effec-
tive, the Idaho statute requires disclosure of financial information well in
advance of the offer's effective date. 44 The target company may thereafter
request a hearing 45 on the offer which will further delay the offer, giving
management who oppose the tender offer time to mount defensive action to
defeat the offer. The court held this delay destroyed the delicate balance
between incumbent management and tender offeror specifically designed by
the Williams Act, and created an undue advantage for management. 6 The
court held such favoritism frustrates the congressional policy of the Wil-
liams Act, and is therefore preempted. 47
Secondly, the Idaho statute was found to conflict with the stated purpose
of the Williams Act: protection of the shareholder. 48 The primary design of
the state law was to protect management rather than shareholders and to
preserve corporate assets within the state.4 9 The law could be invoked only
if the target company had substantial assets5" within the state without regard
to whether there were resident shareholders to protect. The statute made no
attempt to protect the resident shareholders of companies which did not
have substantial assets within the state. The court also pointed out that all
shareholders would be denied the protection of the statute if the target
corporation accepted the tender offer.5' The court thus held that the Idaho
statute frustrated the purpose of the federal law and must yield to the federal
scheme established in the Williams Act.
Having decided the preemption question, the court analyzed the question
of whether the statute imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce. In
making this determination, the court applied the three-part test of Pike.5 2
The first criterion of a legitimate local interest was not satisfied as the state
was pursuing an illegitimate economic interest. The state law was designed
to protect incumbent management by delaying tender offers and to safe-
guard the local economy by preventing removal of the target company's
assets. 3 Nor was the second criterion under Pike satisfied because the Idaho
44. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503 (Supp. 1977).
45. Id. § 30-1503(4).
46. 439 F. Supp. at 437.
47. Id. Prior courts have noted that speed is essential to a tender offer while delay is the
target company's strongest ally. "Delay also breeds uncertainty in the market place and that
possibility leaves the security holder who does want to tender [his shares] in a precarious
position." Cooperweld Corp. v. IMETAL, 403 F. Supp. 579, 608 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (emphasis in
original). Moreover, delay costs money for the offeror who is paying interest or commitment
fees, premiums, and attorneys' fees.
48. See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
49. 439 F. Supp. at 437.
50. IDAHO CODE § 30-1502(1) (Supp. 1977).
51. The court stated that the Idaho Act does not require compliance if the target company
agrees to accept the tender offer, IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(e) (Supp. 1977), thus denying the
shareholders any protection the Act purports to give. 439 F. Supp. at 438.
52. 397 U.S. 132 (1970). Actually, the court's analysis of the commerce clause issue was
unnecessary as the statute had already been invalidated on preemption grounds.
53. The court properly looked beyond the stated purpose of the state law and determined
its true purpose. 439 F. Supp. at 438; see Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10(1928); Locoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 550 (1924); Heisler v. Thomas
Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 (1922). Commentators have also noted that state take-over
statutes are actually "special interest" legislation flying under the color of shareholder protec-
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law had more than an incidental effect on commerce. The requirements of
the state take-over statute in effect precluded Great Western from making
its tender offer anywhere else in the country until the state requirements had
been satisfiedi 4
Additionally, the court balanced the contingent benefit to the sharehold-
ers secured by the state statute against the burden the statute created on
commerce. 5 The court reasoned that the state's extensive pre-effective
delay might thwart tender offers, cause lower offers to be made to the
shareholders, or disrupt the market price of the target company's stock. The
court concluded that if an offeror were forced to comply with numerous
state take-over statutes, an onerous burden would be placed on commerce.
Thus, the Idaho take-over statute failed the constitutional test and was held
to impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.
While this writer agrees with the court's holding in this case, some
questions as to the court's analysis should be raised. As the state law would
allow management to delay the tender offer and thus take defensive action
against the take-over, the court properly concluded that the state regulatory
statute would disrupt commerce. The court suggested that the target
company as a defense could appeal to the shareholders not to tender their
shares. It is entirely possible, however, that shareholders actually benefit by
receiving management's evaluation of the offer, particularly since any infor-
mation given is required to be "true and correct. 5 6 It is likewise doubtful
that the target company could repurchase its own shares, as the court
suggests, if such a practice would be "manipulative or deceptive." 57
While the court reasoned that the delay may have a disruptive effect on
the stock of the target company, there is, as a rule, always a disruptive
effect at the announcement of a tender offer. Such activity on the market is
caused by risk abritrageurs 5 8 professional speculators who purchase the
target stock with the sole purpose of tendering large blocks to the offeror for
a quick profit. This disruption on the market may, in fact, benefit the
shareholder by creating a higher market price for the sale of his shares
should he not wish to wait to tender them to the tender offeror. While pre-
effective delay may at times work to the advantage of the offeror because
the arbitrageur can purchase shares during the delay and later tender them in
a block to the offeror, usually the delay frustrates the offer because the
tion in order to protect incumbent management from attack. Sommer, The Ohio Take-OverAct:
What Is It?, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 720 (1970). See also Note, Commerce Clause
Limitations Upon State Regulations of Tender Offers, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1161-62
(1974).
54. 439 F. Supp. at 439. The Idaho statute provides that tender offers may not be made to
non-Idaho shareholders without also being made to Idaho shareholders. IDAHO CODE § 30-
1056(1) (Supp. 1977).
55. Having failed the threshold test, there was no reason to apply the final test.
56. Management statements are subject to the fraud provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
58. Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints--An Interest Analysis, 21 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 613, 615-16 (1970). For a complete discussion on the role of the risk
arbitrageur, see Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 466
(1971).
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